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NOTES AND COMMENTS
TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - TRAFFIC LIGHT, MOTORIST -
PEDESTRIAN - RELATIVE RIGHTS
The plaintiff, a pedestrian, entered an intersection upon the crosswalk
with the green light in her favor. When she was half way across the
light changed and the defendant motorist approaching from her right,
with the light now indicating green in his favor, ran over the plaintiff's
foot. The trial court charged that neither was wrongfully in the inter-
,ection and that their rights were equal. The jury found for the defend-
ant. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth District, in reversing the judg-
ment, imposed upon the driver an absolute duty to wait until the pedes-
trian had completed the crossing. The Supreme Court upheld the trial
court, saying that the motorist was under no absolute duty to wait until
the pedestrian had crossed; that neither had an absolute right but only
a qualified right; that each had the right to proceed, exercising ordinary
care with respect to the other.1
The problem of right of way at intersections arises in various situa-
tions. As between two automobiles, the one having the right of way by
statute in Ohio has been held to have an "absolute" right to cross but the
court at once added that it is qualified by the requirement that it proceed
in a "lawful manner."' No less protection would be afforded to the
pedestrian who will suffer most in any collision. At common law, pedes-
trian and motorist have equal rights but each must exercise his right
with due regard for the safety of the other.' In the principal case the
court had before it the two alternative rules for the protection of the
pedestrian when caught in the intersection cross walk by a change of
light. The view it adopted is one of relative rights; the motorist, equally
rth the pedestrian, has a right to proceed. To recover, the pedestrian
must prove that the motorist advanced negligently, for negligence will
not be implied from the fact of the accident.4
This rule of relative rights and duties finds support in other juris-
dictions,' and in earlier Ohio cases.6 The Supreme Court rejected the
view adopted by the Court of Appeals that the pedestrian had an abso-
lute right to complete his crossing. Such a rule would establish the
negligence of the driver as a matter of law from the fact of his proceed-
ing while a pedestrian was in the crosswalk. The duties of the motorist
are the same under either rule: to look out for and to use reasonable
1 aMrinovch v. E. R. Jones Co., 135 Ohio St. 137, 19 N.E. (zd) 45z (939).
SMofis v. Bloo-zgrcn, 127 Ohio St. '47, 137 N.E. 2, S9 A.L.R. S3x (1933).
"'Sii r v. Bakc'r, 173 Iowva 1o63, 160 NV.W 372 (1916).
'Ha.'-r;:alc v. Houck, 12Z Md. 3z, S9 Atl. 319 (x13).
". Gi!,, v. Lcas, zSz Pa. 318, 127 Atl. 774 (r9z5); Liberman v. McLaughlin, z3
Ky. 763, 26 S.W. (zd) 753 (1930).
' Cleveland Ry. v. Goldman, zz Ohio St. 73, 17o N.E. 641 (1930).
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care to avoid the pedestrian. The difference lies in the proof of negli-
gence. A different situation is presented when a right-of-way ordinance
is involved. Violation of such an ordinance by the motorist may consti-
tute negligence per se.' But such an ordinance must be unequivocal in
its terms in order to confer an absolute right on the pedestrian. In
Horwitz v. Eurove the Ohio Supreme Court held that an ordinance
which provided: "The right of way upon street crossings . . . shall,
in all cases, be given to pedestrians by all vehicles of every kind," created
only a preferential, not an absolute, right. In this it was consistent with
decisions in other jurisdictions.9
The question in these cases usually involves, not the defendant's
negligence, but the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. Under
either view, the pedestrian must use due care to avoid injury in crossing.
If his right is only relative he must keep a lookout for automobiles, but
he has a right to assume that motorists will obey the light signals.'
If his right to cross is absolute his duty to look out may be lessened.
Some cases dealing with a pedestrian's right of way have said that he
need not keep a continuous lookout.1 ' Where a statute exists, the pedes-
trian has a right to assume that the motorist will obey it."
While a doctrine giving the pedestrian an absolute right would have
the merit of certainty and be more easily applied, it would seem that the
rule of the principal case is more nearly in accord with the usual practice
at street crossings and gives to the plaintiff all that he should reasonably
expect. R. C. H.
TORTS - PROXIMATE CAUSE AND PER SE NEGLIGENCE
A city ordinance of Warren, Ohio, provided that vehicular traffic
was entitled to the right of way between intersections, but that such
provision should not operate to relieve drivers of due care for the safety
of pedestrians.' The plaintiff was struck and injured by the defendant's
automobile, as he attempted to make a crossing between intersections.
Testimony indicated that the automobile was moving at an excessive
aSchell v. DuBoise, adm'r, 94 Ohio St. 93, 113 N.E. 664, 1917A A.L.R. 710 (1916).
SHorwitz v. Eurove, 129 Ohio St. 8, 193 N.E. 644, 96 A.L.R. 782 (1934).
o Rolfs v. Mullins, 179 Iowa 1223, 16z N.W. 783 (917); Bora v. Yellow Cab Co.,
103 N. J. Law 377, I35 Atl. 88q (1927).
'0 Cleveland Ry. v. Goldman, supra, note 6.
"Newman v. Protective Motor Service, z98 Pa. S09, 148 Ati. 71 (930); Grif-
fith v. Slaybaugh, 29 F. (2d) 437 (1928).
'Hart v. Devereux, 41 Ohio St. (1885); Norris v. Jones, 99o Ohio St. 9S,
144 N.E. 274 (1924).
'The Warren ordinance, enacted in 1929: "Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at
any point other than within a marked or unmarked crosswalk shall yield the right of way
to vehicles on the roadway, provided that this provision shall not relieve the driver of a
vehicle from the duty to exercise due care for the safety of pedestrians." (Italics added)
